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Abstract As the ease with which any data are collected and transmitted increases,
more privacy concerns arise leading to an increasing need to protect and preserve
it. Much of the recent high-profile coverage of data mishandling and public mis-
leadings about various aspects of privacy exasperates the severity. The Smart Grid
(SG) is no exception with its key characteristics aimed at supporting bi-directional
information flow between the consumer of electricity and the utility provider. What
makes the SG privacy even more challenging and intriguing is the fact that the very
success of the initiative depends on the expanded data generation, sharing, and pro-
cessing. In particular, the deployment of smart meters whereby energy consumption
information can easily be collected leads to major public hesitations about the tech-
nology. Thus, to successfully transition from the traditional Power Grid to the SG
of the future, public concerns about their privacy must be explicitly addressed and
fears must be allayed. Along these lines, this chapter introduces some of the privacy
issues and problems in the domain of the SG, develops a unique taxonomy of some
of the recently proposed privacy protecting solutions as well as some if the future
privacy challenges that must be addressed in the future.
1 Introduction
The scope of the rights of individuals has been constantly evolving. It has long been
established that the full protection of life and property falls within the individual
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rights coverage for most cultures throughout the human history. While the early
boundaries of the “right to property” have only incorporated the tangible dimen-
sion, the intangible portion has been expanding [159] rapidly since the industrial
revolution. One important component of the intangible part is defined by the right
to privacy, coined by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 [159].
A strong positive correlation between technological development and privacy
concerns is almost universally agreed [160]. In Warren and Brandeis’ terminology,
“the right to be left alone” has expanded to include other personally associable phe-
nomena such as audio, photographs, video, data, and more recently biometric iden-
tification and genetic data) rather than mere physical property. Computerization, au-
tomation, transmission, and storage of data, enabled by recent advances in telecom-
munications, Internet technologies, and mobile and cloud computing services, have
increased the importance and relevance of the term “privacy”.
In spite of its wide usage, the term privacy does not have a universally-agreed-
upon definition [46]1 It is quite remarkable that such an important concept has
evaded a formal definition. The concept of privacy has a long history of discus-
sions of importance, from Greek philosophers including Aristotle (public sphere of
political activity versus private sphere [46]) and Socrates, to Biblical and Quranic
passages [80]. Allen West in his landmark work [160] defines privacy in terms of
self-determination as follows:
Privacy, now, is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.
Another important document about the principles of privacy protection was de-
veloped in 1981 by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) [127] 2 and was later updated in 2013 [126]. Yet, even these guidelines are
not observed by many countries. For example, while the European Union seems to
be following them, the United States does not.
Widespread adoption of privacy protection mechanisms depends on the political
will, which seems to be prioritizing other concerns such as public safety, especially
since September 11, 2001. However, the awareness and demand of the public for a
stronger adoption and enforcement of the privacy regulations has been increasing
unabated. Many recent developments and news such as Wikileaks, US NSA leaks
by Edward Snowden, Facebook’s recent disclosure of Emotion Experiment, EU’s
recent ruling on “right to be forgotten,” have been keeping the topic of privacy dis-
cussions current and fresh in the public sphere, thereby increasing demand for more
action.
In line with technological developments, the ever-changing field of ubiqui-
tous applications, and high-level penetration of mobile and other electronic de-
vices, the potential for privacy violation has been increasing in scope. While
there is a perceived clash between the technology and privacy protection, there
are also many efforts to put the use of technology in its defense. One pioneering
1 Some technology company executives have gone so far to declare privacy irrelevant, dead, or
even defunct. A more elaborate debunking of these myths can be found in [138].
2 http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm
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work that has spawned quite a lot of attention, interest, and follow-up studies is
Chaum’s paper [27] in 1985 on providing privacy to individuals and organizations
bi-directionally in a secure fashion. He argues for embedding privacy-providing
mechanisms in the design and development of the technology by means of cryp-
tography. Chaum’s ideas are further developed and formalized under the term of
privacy-enhancing technologies (PET) in 1995 [140] and then in 2003 [15]. PET is
defined in [15]:
PET stands for a coherent system of ICT measures that protects privacy by eliminating or re-
ducing personal data or by preventing unnecessary and/or undesired processing of personal
data, all without losing the functionality of the information system.
Our work in this chapter is line with the notion of PET, which we use to provide
an understanding and awareness of privacy issues, challenges, and threats in the
Smart Grid (SG), the next generation of the traditional Power Grid enhanced with
state-of-the-art computing and communications technologies. Just as is the case with
many engineering and technical decisions, the touted benefits of the SG initiative
comes with many risks and trade-offs. The deployment and adoption of Smart Grid
technologies have opened up several security issues at the levels of the consumer, the
communication, and the energy provider. Security aspects such as confidentiality,
authentication, authorization, integrity, and non-repudiation have been extensively
investigated and various innovative solutions have been proposed in the literature.
There are many publications on SG security, including survey style articles and
books, such as [44], [8], [12], [24], [30], [37], [61], [62], [63], [75], [82], [88], [104],
[109], [114], [117], [125], [150], [156], [157], [161], [163], [171], [2], [4], and [3].
While some of these address privacy, explicitly or implicitly, there is a need for an
up-to-date coverage of SG privacy techniques. In contrast to most previous works
with the SG security focus, our main motivation in this chapter is to review, classify,
discuss, and analyze recent SG privacy solutions that have been proposed in the
literature. In addition, we also provide a comprehensive treatment of the approaches,
mechanisms, and cryptographic tools used in the SG to support the use and design
of privacy enforcing techniques.
1.1 Contributions
In this chapter, we provide a novel taxonomy of privacy provisioning and protection
techniques in the SG. The comprehensive survey, explanations, and discussions of
the various privacy schemes are expected to serve as a good reference for those in-
terested in working on privacy issues in the SG environment. The rest of the chapter
is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief SG overview. Section 3 discusses
the privacy-related problems within the SG environment and explains why privacy
is crucial in the overall success of the SG paradigm. Section 4 presents a novel
taxonomy of recently proposed privacy-preserving solutions for the SG. Section 5
explores outstanding challenges that must be addressed in the future and opportuni-
ties for new research directions. Section 6 concludes the chapter.
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2 Background on Smart Grid
In this section, we present the main features of the traditional Power Grid followed
by the SG vision.
2.1 Traditional Power Grid
The current traditional electric Power Grid is considered to be the largest man-made
machine in the world. Its infrastructure and operations have not changed signifi-
cantly over the past century. Its architecture mainly consists of four sections, as
shown in Fig. 15.1: generation 3, transmission, distribution, and consumption. A
Fig. 15.1 Architecture of the traditional electric Power Grid
high-level structure of its topology and its components are displayed in Fig. 15.2.
The generation of energy is highly centralized and is carried out in bulk mode,
such as nuclear systems, hydroelectric systems, wind farms, and others. The high-
voltage electricity is relayed in the transmission subsystem over long distances.
When handed off to the distribution subsystem, the energy is converted into medium
voltage. Through the distribution subsystem substations, the voltage is reduced to
lower values and then distributed to a variety of end-users, from commercial, indus-
trial, business, to residential areas. The energy production and distribution schema
are supervised by a centralized control system, known as Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, in charge of mapping and visualizing any op-
erational activity in the field as well as controlling the storage and demand of power.
In fact, SCADA systems can remotely and locally control the power transmission
and distribution based on the current demand and peak loads thereby minimizing
unnecessary power generation.
3 We use the terms generation and production interchangeably.
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Fig. 15.2 A high-level structure of the current Power Grid
2.2 The Smart Grid Vision
SG is a term generally used to refer to an enhancement of the traditional Power Grid,
especially, in terms of the computing and communications technologies. SG can be
defined as follows [67, 57]:
The SG can be regarded as an electric system that uses information, two-way, cyber-secure
communication technologies, and computational intelligence in an integrated fashion across
electricity generation, transmission, substations, distribution and consumption to achieve a
system that is clean, safe, secure, reliable, resilient, efficient, and sustainable.
“System of Systems” is a term generally used to qualify the SG in the literature to
emphasize its heterogeneity.
Economic development and its sustainability are closely coupled with the effec-
tive, efficient, and robust use of the energy. The energy sector, and especially the
grid infrastructure, has traditionally focused on the reliable provisioning. Until re-
cently, communications and flow of information have been considered only with
extraneous significance. Under an aging and ineffective energy distribution system,
unprecedented initiatives have recently been instituted in many countries to improve
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the Power Grid with the SG. The key facilitators of the SG are two-way energy and
information flows between the suppliers and consumers. The conventional supply
chain of the energy is being expanded to include alternative sources of energy, such
as solar, wind, tidal, biomass, and so on. from a variety of distributed small and large
energy producers. The consumers are becoming more active participants by means
of such devices as smart meters, smart thermostats, smart appliances. The grand
vision of an autonomic, self-healing SG with a dynamic demand response model
with pricing still has many challenges, not the very least from the perspective of
the networking infrastructure and distributed computing. Demand Response (DR)
is defined by the US Department of Energy as follows [53]:
Changes in electric usage by end-use customers from their normal consumption patterns in
response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to incentive payments designed
to induce lower electricity use at times of high wholesale market prices or when system
reliability is jeopardized.
The sheer size of the contemplated SG of the future is to rival the Internet in the num-
ber of participants. Smarter generation, transmission, distribution, and consumption
of electricity are essential to achieve a reliable, clean, safe, resilient, secure, effi-
cient, and sustainable power system [57].
Some of the noteworthy standardization efforts, high-level conceptual reference
models, and roadmaps for the SG are given by the NIST Framework and Roadmap
for SG Interoperability Standards [123], IEC SG Standardization Roadmap [83],
CEN/CENELEC/ETSI Joint Working Group on Standards for SGs [55], and IEEE
P2030 [1]. A conceptual view of the NIST’s SG reference model is depicted in
Fig. 15.3 with seven domains: customers, markets, service providers, operations,
generation, transmission, and distribution. As compared to Fig. 15.2, the generation
is no longer in bulk; it also includes the distributed and renewable energy sources
as well. It is also worth noting from Fig. 15.3 the bi-directional electricity and in-
formation flows and the integration of the renewables. Another important conceptu-
alization is the addition of third-party services to enhance the energy consumption
experience of the end-users by means of open markets. The financial gears are also
in place: global investment on SG had exceeded $15 billion as of 2013, more than a
four-fold increase from 2008 levels [85].
The most relevant domain of the NIST Conceptual Model for this chapter is the
Distribution Domain (as depicted in Fig. 15.3), because it is the main physical inter-
face between the end-user and the SG and it is the center of almost all of the potential
privacy violations. Note that it is also the Distribution Domain that is responsible for
achieving the most widely-cited benefits of the SG which include control, measure-
ment, sensing, data collection and storage, and optimization of operations that take
place in or for it.
The anticipated benefits [123] of the SG include:
• Increased power reliability and quality.
• Optimized resources to smoothen the power demand to avoid using expensive
peaker capacity.
• Improved resilience to disruption by natural disasters and attacks.
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Fig. 15.3 NIST’s 7-Domain Smart Grid Conceptual Model
• Automated systems to enable self-healing responses to system disturbances.
• Incorporation of distributed and/or renewable energy sources.
• Reduction of greenhouse emissions.
• Actionable and timely energy usage information to customers.
• Facilitation of plug-in electric vehicles and new energy storage options.
2.3 Smart Meters and AMI
In transitioning from the Power Grid to the SG, Automatic Meter Reading (AMR)
has provided a stepping stone functionality. AMR provides automatic collection of
data from the energy metering devices and transmission of them to a central location
for further processing and analysis.
In the SG, AMR is replaced by Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) which
enables bidirectional data transfer between the meter and the grid. The meter that
provides such functionality in the SG is usually referred to as a Smart meter. Smart
meters can read real-time energy consumption information as well as other oper-
ationally needed data, such as voltage values, phase angle and the frequency, and
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so on. Smart meters are solid state programmable devices that can perform many
functions allowing users to perform intended tasks by inputting a sequence of in-
structions into their processing unit and memory. Among some of the tasks that a
smart meter can do are [122]: time-based pricing, collecting consumption data for
consumer and utility, net metering, loss of power (and restoration) notification, bet-
ter access and data to manage energy, decision and selection of rate options, remote
turn on/turn off operations, load limiting for bad pay or demand response purposes,
energy prepayment, power quality monitoring, meter tampering and energy theft
detection, costs reduction in wrong estimations of billings, service and operational
reduction in traditional tasks of metering reading, or communications with other in-
telligent devices or appliance devices in the home. Although all these tasks may not
be supported by a particular meter and there might be other tasks that it can do, the
overall idea is that smart meters make it possible to add some kind of intelligence to
the network and individual features of each residential consumer.
There are several technologies and applications that have been integrated to per-
form as one in an AMI system [122] including: smart meters, wide-area commu-
nications infrastructure, Home (local) Area Networks (HANs), Meter Data Man-
agement Systems (MDMS), and operational gateways working as main collectors.
Fig. 15.5 shows a model of AMI system as envisioned by NIST from the perspective
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of computer networking terminology by means of interconnected nodes and clouds
to emphasize the bidirectional nature of the communication enabled by AMI.
Another abstraction of the AMI network is presented in Figs. 15.6 and 15.7 that
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Fig. 15.6 Smart Grid Advanced Metering Infrastructure
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Fig. 15.7 Details of HAN, BAN, and IAN
show the concepts of HAN, Building Area Network (BAN), Industrial Area Net-
work (IAN), Neighborhood Area Network (NAN), and Field Area Network (FAN).
There is some notion of hierarchy in AMI when data are collected, processed, and
analyzed to optimize the energy use and bring about the benefits of the SG. Such a
hierarchy of the communications architecture is depicted in Fig. 15.8. Smart meters
span out from feeders, which may also serve as natural data aggregation points.
Feeders are controlled by the distribution substations, which are in turn connected
to the transmission substations. NIST domains interact with this hierarchy to provide
a new level of experience and service as part of the SG.
2.4 Microgrids
One of the many new mechanisms of the SG for power delivery is microgrids [99,
97, 153]. As a low voltage distribution network, microgrids4 are autonomous energy
management systems under the control of a single administrative authority that is
capable of operating in parallel to or in intentional or accidental islanded mode from
4 Microgrids are referred to as Distributed Resource Island Systems in IEEE 1547 terminology.
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the existing Power Grid. They usually include distributed and renewable energy
sources as well as some level of energy storage subsystems. A representation of a
microgrid model is shown in Fig. 15.9.
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Fig. 15.9 A microgrid model
3 Smart Grid Privacy Issues
Demand Side Management (DSM) is one of the most important components of
the grid of the future [113]. The overarching goal of DSM is to improve the ef-
ficiency and effectiveness through energy consumption scheduling. DSM tries to
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shift and/or reduce the load to achieve its objective by reducing the Peak-to-Average
Ratio (PAR), cost, and so on. In [119], energy-cost and PAR minimization are per-
formed with the help of an energy consumption scheduler and a Linear Program-
ming (LP) formulation. Joint energy payment and waiting time minimization are
studied in [118]. A game theoretic approach is proposed to maximize the utility
function in [143]. In [172], a consumption scheduling algorithm based on Integer
Linear Programming (ILP) and game theory is applied to minimize load. In contrast
to the current grid, one of the key features of the future grid is to adjust loads dy-
namically, turning them on or off as needed. This is called load shedding. In [76],
an optimization framework is proposed to find the minimum amount of load to shed
while satisfying load-balancing and shedding constraints. Dynamic load-shedding
schemes have been studied in the presence of large disturbances accounting system
dynamics [7, 45]. [48] presents a two-step algorithm for the optimal load shedding
in an intentional island.
Given the information collected by smart meters in the SG environment, privacy
issues become a vital concern for the success of SG initiatives. In the SG AMI, the
privacy goes beyond anonymity to include undetectability of operational status of
individual residential appliances. It has been well-known for quite a while that it is
trivial to determine sophisticated usage patterns from the smart meter data by using
rather simple statistical methods [120, 158]. Prevention of this kind of violation is
the main aspect of privacy that we are addressing in this chapter.
The privacy-related issue here is that for proper functioning of the AMI system,
very detailed and often precise information about users’ electricity usage is needed.
Hence, while this smart system could offer many great benefits, it takes away a
significant level of privacy a user may like to have. In the rest of this section, we
first elaborate on the general notion of privacy and then delve into some details as
to why we need to address the privacy concerns explicitly and convincingly.
3.1 Basic Privacy Concepts
Privacy may be defined as the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to de-
termine when, how, and to what extent information about themselves is communi-
cated to others [160]. The notion of privacy may vary from person to person, and
from culture to culture. It could also be defined as the right to informational self-
determination, that is, individuals must be able to determine for themselves when,
how, to what extent, and for what purpose information about them is communicated
to others [132]. This term is often related to an entity’s (individual, group, or in-
stitution) identity or anonymity. As human beings, each of us likes to keep certain
information about ourselves confidential while we like to express some information
to draw a distinct line with others or to make a presence in the society that we live
in. Similarly, a group or institution may have some information for disclosure to the
public while sensitive information must be protected from being disclosed to un-
wanted parties. The unwanted parties may include individuals who are not members
15 Techniques, Taxonomy, and Challenges of Privacy Protection in the Smart Grid 13
of the group or institution, other groups or institutions, a person with short-term
membership, or a deliberate intruder (attacker) attempting to retrieve information
illegitimately.
The definition and boundaries of privacy tend to vary among different societies
and cultures and as such, there is no clear list of categories of privacy that can be
applicable for all. However, four major types of privacy are generally recognized:
• Personal privacy. This includes mainly body privacy and territorial privacy.
Body privacy varies among individuals in terms of the types of clothing one
wears to protect the body. Territorial privacy means making a boundary or to cre-
ate a barrier between the person and others. This can be implemented by erecting
walls, fences, or screens, by using cathedral glass/partitions, by maintaining a
distance, among other things.
• Information privacy. This kind of privacy is mainly related to passing of in-
formation over various media and could also be called communications privacy.
Some of the notable information privacies are:
– Internet privacy. The ability to determine the kind of information one reveals
or withholds about oneself over the Internet, who has access to such informa-
tion, and for what purposes one’s information may or may not be used.
– Financial information privacy: information about own bank account, amount
of money, transaction details, debt, and so on.
– Medical privacy: information about a persons health conditions.
– Political privacy: political stance such as who a person may have voted for.
Information privacy also means how someone expresses matters about him- or
herself in any field. People are sometimes willing to give up information about
themselves not because they are ignorant or because they are being tricked by evil
corporations, but because it can sometimes be in their best interests to do so [116,
115]. Such information can be posted on the Internet or via social networks or
other channels the person is involved with. So, in such a case, a person may
judge the benefit of exposing such information, which he or she may like others
to know but not through him- or herself directly, to be avoiding the accountability
or responsibility of such apparent ”leak” of information.
• Organization privacy. this includes the confidential information about an or-
ganization such as business strategies, loss and profit statistics, current trend in
the market, future products, potential customers, transaction details, and similar
information. An organization may put some information in the public arena for
transparency (which will show the ethical standard of the organization, com-
monly accessible by anybody) and declares certain information as classified,
which is a categorization applied to information that a government or a group
claims as sensitive. Prominent examples of organizational security could be of-
ten associated with trade secrets and national security.
• Spiritual and intellectual privacy. This kind of privacy includes a person’s spir-
itual nature, of his or her feelings and intellect. A person may have certain reli-
gious beliefs but may not like to express these to others. It may be because of
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the adverse or hostile environment. Also, a highly intelligent person may act as
dumb or may not like to show his or her intelligence in all gatherings. For ex-
ample, a person working in a research group may restrain from showing all his
or her talents to others so that others may not take his or her ideas away without
giving proper credit, or it may be that the person is selfish or may like not to
actually get involved in intellectual contribution in the group for some personal
reasons.
As the meanings of privacy are different in various scenarios, there are other
ways of looking at it. [131] and [121] described six types of privacies related to a
mans personality: (1) solitude, (2) isolation, (3) anonymity, (4) reserve, (5) intimacy
with friends, and (vi) intimacy with family. Solitude is the most complete state of
privacy that individuals can achieve. It is a type of privacy in which the individual
is alone and unobserved. Pedersen [131] differentiates between isolation termed as
alone and away from others and solitude defined as alone by oneself and free from
observation by others. Anonymity is a type of privacy that occurs when it is possi-
ble to move around in public or, for example, browsing through the Internet without
being recognized or being the subject of attention. Reserved behavior includes ex-
amples of low self-disclosure. Finally, any kind of intimacy is a type of privacy that
relates to an individual’s or group’s desire to promote close personal relationships.
All of these personal traits of human beings need to be studied and thoroughly un-
derstood while making any policy related to privacy in any sector, because the same
human beings are the beneficiaries or users of these systems.
3.2 The Need for Privacy in the Smart Grid
In a SG network, key questions regarding setting the policies on user data privacy
are [84]:
• Who owns the data of the customer?
• How is the access to and use of customer data regulated?
• Who guarantees privacy and security of customer data (e.g., against risk of
surveillance or criminal activity)?
• Will sale or transfer of customer data be allowed, and under what terms and to
whose benefit?
• In jurisdictions with retail choice, are measures needed to ensure competing elec-
tricity providers have access to customer data on the same terms as the incumbent
utility?
In fact, rival electricity providers may compete to dominate the market, and their
access to users electricity usage patterns and behavioral information could be very
crucial. The electricity providers or provider agents may use the user data to de-
termine their business strategies and special packages or offers. In an open market
environment, such data could be partially collected after the offers are made public
and some information is available for all, but if privacy is breached beforehand and
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specific user data is available to some parties, then these electricity providers may
have unfair gains. Appropriate privacy policies may restrict, mitigate, or resolve
such use of unfair means in setting business strategies. All these issues explain why
the privacy of data of SG users is a very critical issue both for users and the electric-
ity providers.
The privacy of SG users is a very important issue. The strong integration of Infor-
mation and Communication Technologies (ICTs) for the SGs operation introduces
different types of privacy concerns. Depending on how the consumer (or user) uses
electricity and recharges it, the privacy of the user can be affected by two usage
scenarios namely:
• The user recharges electricity balance via personal interaction (private
mode). For instance, the user goes in person to the electricity providers agent
and recharges his “smart electricity card” similar to a credit or debit card that can
be reloaded and placed into the electricity meter. The other personal interaction
may happen via the phone or in person by going to the agent and getting a new
recharge or reload number, similar to that used in many places for pre-paid mo-
bile phone balance or validity extension. The customer can also obtain a recharg-
ing number obtained from a pre-paid card. This method does not reveal the iden-
tity of the person who has purchased the card, which is later used in the electrical
meter to do the reloading task. It is worth pointing out that the authorization
number will need to be validated and authenticated before electricity consump-
tion. When this number is entered from any home or building (connected to the
SG), it passes through an authentication process during which information could
be stored by the utility company or one of its designated agents. This information
needs privacy protection measures in place.
• The users recharge their electricity balance via the Internet (public mode).
If any website or online system is used and the balances are adjusted via payment
through some bank account or other payment methods, then all the cybersecurity-
related privacy issues must be considered. When a web interface is used and
there is a back-end database, web attacks (such as Structured Query Language
(SQL) injection [95]) could affect the privacy of the user by disclosing not-to-
be-exposed data from the back-end database. The web-based (i.e., online) form
to recharge the user’s electricity balance could be made as simple as requiring
a single identification number from the user. The privacy issue in this process is
whether the user wants to be known at the time of recharging a balance for future
electricity usage. In fact, user’s information can be used by different departments
or branches of the electricity provider. The user may choose who can access
the information and who can not. An instance of personal preference can be the
option of receiving company related news, updates, or offers of newly introduced
packages or benefits from the electricity supplier company to the user’s email
address. For managing user’s own preferences, agent technology [147] could be
used, in which each subscriber or user is assigned an agent representing the user’s
interests. Each service can also be assigned an agent to reap the most benefit.
A service agent could negotiate with subscriber agents about information and
authorizations versus the quality of the offered service.
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The level of personal information involved and used will dramatically increase
with the modernization of the grid. Smart meters and smart appliances could lead
to a data explosion of intimate details of daily life. However, at this point, it is quite
unclear as to who will gain access to this information, besides the customer’s utility
provider, and control utilities. With the deployment of the SG, energy measurements
can take place at much shorter intervals (unlike at the end of the billing cycle as in
conventional methods).
Currently, there are several types of concerns related to the privacy and security
of data associated with the SG. In this chapter, we focus on the issue of privacy
linked with consumer information. Potential privacy concerns of SG consumers in-
clude: how the required information is going to be collected, used, and disclosed;
how customer information is expected to be safeguarded and how it may be used
for or against the consumers; how permissions will be granted for the collected data
to be shared with multiple agencies; and the liabilities related to any breaches of
consumer information. It is also worthwhile exploring how the SG will know about
individuals. For example, the energy fluctuation pattern of home appliances is so
unique that it may be possible to infer, for example, the model applied for a user’s
refrigerator. It is also worth noting that many times data that is harmless when col-
lected in isolation may become a privacy threat when combined with other types of
data, or examined by a third party for a pattern.
Even when the data about electricity consumption is not collected at regular in-
tervals, information can still be collected at a slower rate through the persistent mon-
itoring of energy consumption. As a result, private information such as how many
people live in a household, their presence and absence at home, their schedules for
taking showers, watching TV, frequency of microwave use, and their sleeping pat-
terns can be collected or deduced. For many individuals, the collection of this type
of information represents an invasion of the “sanctity of the home”, and one may
argue that such intimate details of someone’s daily life should not be accessible. The
user’s data could disclose their usage pattern of electric devices, and very intimate
details of household equipment, even their possible locations (e.g. if the SG con-
cept also is combined with the smart home concept where, when a person leaves a
room the lights and electric equipment are automatically turned on or off). In such
a case, even the movement pattern of the user within his or her own home could be
deduced!
The privacy concerns discussed here are further confirmed by a study called Pri-
vacy Impact Assessment (PIA) [4] conducted in September 2009 by the Privacy
Sub-Group of the Cyber Security Working Group. The report has identified the fol-
lowing issues and concerns related to consumer-to-utility information exchanges in
the US SG:
• There is no clear understanding of the privacy issues on the SG.
• There are a lack of standards, privacy policies, or procedures by the entities in-
volved in the SG and the collection of information.
• Definitions of personally identifiable information are inconsistent in the utility
industry.
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• Smart meters and distributed energy systems may reveal information about resi-
dential consumers and activities within the house.
• Roaming SG devices (e.g., electrical vehicle recharging at other charging stations
such as a friend’s house) may generate more personal information.
• Even though the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
adopted the 2000 resolution5 urging the adoption of privacy principles, only a
few state utility level commissions have begun to assess privacy issues associ-
ated with the SG. This is the case with the state of California through its eight
Fair Information Practice (FIP) principles6 such as transparency, right to access
information collected (individual participation), individual access to see and copy
information stored on an individual, limited types of information that may be col-
lected on an individual (collection limitation), limited internal use of information
about an individual, data quality and integrity, data security, accountability, and
auditing.
3.3 Load-Monitoring Techniques
As we mentioned previously, the possibility of learning information about individ-
uals’ behaviors, personal habits, and lifestyle raises concerns. This becomes an im-
portant issue when this information can be used for other purposes besides deliver-
ing electricity. Electric utilities and other providers may have access to information
about the in-house activities of customers, the times when they are using various
devices and appliances, as well as the type of devices being used. The initial goal
of collecting electricity usage information to generate an electricity profile has now
become a source of behavioral information with an immense potential. The most
serious threats related to the privacy deterioration of SG consumers include: cyber-
attack and intrusion, identity theft, tracking and observing the behavioral patterns of
the consumers and the appliances being used, and real-time spying and surveillance.
In intrusive load monitoring (ILM), there is an individual monitor for each appli-
ance to acquire the aggregate energy consumption of household electric devices.
An alternative technique for deducing the appliance usage characteristics is called
non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM), or non-intrusive appliance load monitoring
(NIALM), where only one individual monitor is enough to decide the energy usage
from the aggregate data. NILM was first reported in 1992 [77]. Since then, various
other techniques have been developed for NILM that separate individual appliance
power consumption levels from from single, aggregated measurements. Recent sur-
5 http://www.naruc.org/Resolutions/privacy principles.pdf.
6 Senate Bill 1476 was passed in 2010 to protect the privacy and security of cus-
tomer data generated by advanced meters. The California Public Utilities Commis-
sion (CPUC) subsequently issued Decision (D.)11-07-056 on July 28, 2011 to imple-
ment SB 1476. See http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/D77BA276-E88A-4C82-AFD2-
FC3D3C76A9FC/0/TheEvolvingRoleofStateRegulationinCybersecurity9252012FINAL.pdf for
more details.
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Fig. 15.10 Aggregate power consumption data from [107]
Fig. 15.11 Inferred switch events from [107]
veys about NILM can be found in [158], [168]. An illustration of the concept is
presented in [107] as depicted in Figs. 15.10, 15.11, and 15.12, where a behavior
extraction algorithm implemented in Matlab is used. DSM and Demand response
systems provide sufficient power usage information to reveal in-home activities that
might be disturbing for the privacy of the households. It is worth noting that NILM
can be easily implemented using off-the-shelf hardware and software without much
technical expertise.
As a result, privacy concerns, coupled with a degree of security related issues,
may lead to any of the following unintended consequences [150, 93, 101], or some
other vulnerabilities not currently identified:
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Fig. 15.12 Identified load events from [120]
• Hackers could manipulate power consumption and billing.
• Cyber-terrorists might fake power consumption data on a large scale to attack the
power system.
• Attackers may take control of the smart meters for manipulation at will.
• Direct marketers, criminals, law enforcement agencies may use the energy con-
sumption data without prior approval or notification.
• Energy consumption patterns of individual appliances can be identified with high
accuracy.
Thus, privacy is the Achilles’ heel for the success of the SG and needs to be carefully
investigated and addressed.
4 Privacy Solutions
In this section, we present a novel taxonomy of the privacy techniques proposed for
the SG domain, and we provide a synopsis of each category with references, and
compare and contrast them.
4.1 Taxonomy of Privacy Techniques
A comprehensive and novel taxonomy of the SG privacy-protection mechanisms
and approaches is given in Fig. 15.13. We divide the SG approaches into spatial and
temporal broad categories. The former include those that devise privacy into the
system by means of a physical device or entity while the latter incorporates privacy
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Fig. 15.13 Privacy-preservation techniques used in the SG.
into the system by means of logical extensions. We note that the individual cate-
gories identified in Fig. 15.13 do not necessarily indicate an exclusive technique.
In fact, a privacy preservation proposal reported in the literature may, and usually
does, implement a combination of them. The categorization of Fig. 15.13 is to pro-
vide a delineation of identifiably distinguishable techniques to provide a smoother
and clear explanation in what follows. A different approach has been taken in [167]
where privacy preservation techniques are presented with a combination of methods
from parts of Fig. 15.13 on a per paper basis.
Next, we provide a discussion of the spatial and temporal categories along with
their subclasses.
4.2 Spatial Privacy Techniques
There are five main categories of spatial privacy-protection mechanisms proposed in
the literature for the SG, as shown in Fig. 15.14, together with the cited references.
4.2.1 Trusted Third Party
A trusted third party (TTP) in cryptography is an independent entity that acts as a
liaison between two or more collaborating organizations; which, in our case, is be-
tween the end-user and the power utility [154, 51, 19]. The TTP has to be completely
trusted by all participants with respect to its intentions, technical competence, and
so on, so mutual trust can be achieved. In the literature, TTP is also referred to as
the third party escrow service [51].
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Fig. 15.14 Spatial privacy-provisioning techniques for the Smart Grid
In what follows, we elaborate on the approach in [51] as one example in this
category: [51] provides a mechanism for anonymizing high-frequency energy mea-
surement data (such as usage patterns of specific electrical appliances) through the
use of a Pseudonymous Identity (PID). The anonymous meter readings are difficult
to associate with a particular smart meter or customer, thus offering a higher level
of privacy to the SG user.
The distinguishing feature of the Escrow smart meter is that it has two separate
IDs, rather than a single ID as is the case with standard smart meters. The two IDs
are the high-frequency ID (HFID) which is anonymous, and the low-requency ID
(LFID) [23], which can be related to a specific customer or smart meter. The main
idea of the scheme is to provide anonymity of the HFID messages. The anonymity
is implemented by not disclosing the HFID to the utility or the smart meter installer.
The HFID is ’hidden’ inside the smart meter, or hard-coded to be used for all HFID-
related messages. In order for the utility to verify the legitimacy of the HFID, a third
party Escrow mechanism is implemented. The third-party can be the manufacturer
of the smart meter itself or some other trusted third-party, which has been given ac-
cess to this information. The manufacturer can assign two unique IDs to each smart
meter that is produced, only one of which (LFID) is visible to the utility, both during
the procurement and deployment procedures. Essentially, the manufacturer (or the
Escrow service) is the only party that is aware (and has a record) of the connection
between a valid HFID or LFID pair. The Escrow is required to comply with a strong
data privacy policy. For example, the Escrow may not be expected to access, pro-
cess, or store smart metering data - it will only know about the relationship between
a valid HFID and LFID.
4.2.2 Gateway-based approaches
In the gateway-based approach, an external entity outside of the customer premises
acts on behalf of the end-users to obfuscate the relationship between the data and
the owner [133, 33, 141, 28, 29, 71, 105, 141].
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The Smart Energy Gateway (SEG) architecture [133] is deployed at users’
premises and uses a privacy manager, which is designed as a software component
running on SEG, deployed at users’ premises. The idea behind the architecture is
to provide user-centric privacy, which means that the user could be in control of
his or her own privacy parameters. The proposed privacy manager has the ability
to specify privacy conditions and obligations with respect to the handling of users’
private data, and to rely on SEG security architecture features such as application
isolation, mandatory access control, pseudonymity, and secure storage to reliably
enforce the users’ specified privacy constraints. The main features of the privacy
manager include:
• Customer privacy preference specification and enforcement. the energy cus-
tomer would express how personal information disclosed should be handled and
the utility or service provider would express how customer’s information will be
treated. Privacy policies enforcement: each SEG application policy is bound to a
smart software agent and has to be validated against the SEG platform integrity
policy both during the installation and at runtime. This ensures that SEG only
hosts and runs smart software agents that meet pre-defined gateway security re-
quirements (e.g., that the former will not access locally-stored energy usage data
collected at this particular premise).
• Secure storage and data masking. The secure storage will guarantee the con-
fidentiality and accuracy of locally-stored energy usage data. Only trusted and
legitimate applications (e.g., billing provider software agent) can access the me-
tered data repository.
• Pseudonymity. Enables the customer to use SG resources or related services
without revealing their respective identities but remaining accountable for their
transactions.
• Privacy feedback. Allows the display of feedbacks to the energy customer re-
garding the handling of its personally identifiable information.
4.2.3 Architectural schemes
Architectural schemes arrange the topology of the smart meters in order to imple-
ment privacy protection. Two distinct categories are considered:
1. Overlay. Randomly organized smart meters form peer-to-peer groups in [59]
using Chord algorithm [149]. Peer anonymization algorithm together with in-
network aggregation enhance the privacy protection capabilities of the proposed
approach.
2. Ring topology. A few proposed approaches [10, 166, 60, 103, 105, 111, 151, 71]
take advantage of imposing some form of a ring architecture for the SG meters.
For example, a virtual ring architecture is proposed in [10] to provide a privacy
protection solution using symmetric or asymmetric encryption of customers’ re-
quests belonging to the same group.
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4.2.4 Storage-based mechanisms
As the name implies, a type of energy storage infrastructure is employed for the
privacy protection in this category [89, 170, 92, 65, 90]. For example, the authors
in [90], and [89] assume that future smart homes will contain several energy storage
and energy generation devices, and thus electrical power routing will be feasible.
More details of this are given in Section 4.3.6, under Time series-based privacy.
4.2.5 Privacy with distributed energy generation
The main idea behind privacy protection using Distributed Energy Generation (DEG
or a.k.a. Distributed Energy Resources or DER) relies on the intermittent and
stochastic energy values provided by DEG to mask the actual energy consumption
from the disclosed values assuming that DEG is private to the end-user.
4.3 Temporal Privacy Techniques
A second major category of privacy preservation techniques we consider includes
those that implement techniques over time without relying on an external tangible
entity. We describe some of these techniques in this category.
4.3.1 Compression-based approach
As the name implies, the energy consumption data is transformed using compression
techniques to protect the privacy [135, 102]. Compression alone may not be strong
enough and thus [135] uses it in combination with other techniques.
[102] makes use of the technique of compressed sensing from signal process-
ing to provide privacy protection. Compressed sensing [47, 21, 20], also known as
sparse sampling, assumes the smart meter data is sparse with uniform delay and
uses a secret random sequence so that the original data can be reconstructed at the
receiving end.
4.3.2 Cryptographic
There are various cryptographic techniques reported in the literature that are used
to provide privacy in the SG as shown in Fig. 15.15. We divide the cryptographic
temporal privacy-protection techniques into seven categories and discuss them here.
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Fig. 15.15 Cryptographic temporal privacy-protection techniques for the Smart Grid
4.3.2.1 Privacy through Identity-Based Encryption
An identity-based encryption (IdBE) scheme is a public-key cryptosystem where
the key may be selected to be any string, such as email addresses, dates, and so on.
It was first introduced as a problem in [146] with solutions in [40], [17], and [146].
IdBE may be used for privacy in the SG as discussed in [91].
4.3.2.2 Privacy through Attribute-Based Encryption
In the attribute-based encryption (AbE) [72], ciphertexts are associated with sets of
attributes. Private keys are coupled with access structures to control which cipher-
texts can be used to decrypt them. AMI is an important component of the overall
DR system, as defined before in Section 2.2. In [100], the authors propose to protect
multicast communications involving crucial DR messages from the control center
to the smart meters by means of an AbE implementation.
4.3.2.3 Privacy through ID Anonymization
Anonymization is a general term that decouples a message from its originator. Sev-
eral proposals in the literature take advantage of the anonymization techniques for
the SG privacy [32, 31, 59, 12].
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4.3.2.4 Secure Multiparty Computation
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) has been developed as an alternative to the
TTP approach. SMC is a set of techniques to compute a function collectively with
the assurance that at the end of the multiparty computation, no participant can learn
anything except its own input and the result. Then intended information should be
inferable only from these two pieces of information. Historically, SMC was initiated
to address Yao’s Millionaire Problem [165] where two parties can know which of
them is richer without disclosing their actual wealth. Yao’s two-party solution was
extended to multiple parties in [69].
1. Secure comparison. This is an implementation of the Yao’s Millionaire Prob-
lem [165], as described above. [151] used secure comparisons algorithms as part
of the overall SMC approach for smart meter data processing.
2. Homomorphic encryption. One of the most common methods to ensure privacy
in the SG has been the homomorphic encryption technique, which dates back to
the first problem formulation in 1978 [139]. A partial homomorphic encryption
that preserves the structure of multiplication or division, but not both, has been
used until recently. The solution has been elusive until the formulation of the first
fully homomorphic encryption scheme in 2009 [66]. Homomorphic encryption
enables computation on the encrypted data without revealing the plaintext. Given
a homomorphic encryption function E(), and two messages x,y, the following
relationship is guaranteed:
E(x y) = E(x)?E(y), (15.1)
without knowing the plaintext x,y, and the private key. Paillier cryptosystem [129,
128] is an example of an additive homomorphic encryption, where with respect
to Eq. 15.1,  is multiplication and ? is addition. In other words, the sum of
plaintext is calculated from multiplication of the ciphertext. Another commonly
used additive homomorphic encryption is the Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) cryp-
tosystem [18], which is based on Paillier but with bilinear groups.
Implementation of homomorphic encryption techniques for privacy preserva-
tion in the Smart grid are given in [28], [29], [33], [54], [64], [71], [96], [100],
[101], [110], [111], [141], [142], [154], and [166]. For example, the authors
of [110] propose an Energy Privacy Preserving Aggregation (EPPA) scheme for
secure SG communications. EPPA uses a multi-dimensional data aggregation
approach based on the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem [129], which is com-
posed of three algorithms namely, key generation, encryption, and decryption.
The proposed technique is based on composite residuosity classes, whose compu-
tation is believed to be computationally difficult. It is a probabilistic asymmetric
algorithm for public key cryptography and inherits additive homomorphic prop-
erties [139]. Homomorphic encryption allows specific types of computations to
be carried out on ciphertext and obtain an encrypted result. For example, one user
could add two encrypted numbers and then another user could decrypt the result,
without either of them being able to find the value of the individual numbers. Ho-
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momorphic encryption schemes are malleable by design. Another homomorphic
encryption system for the privacy-preserving data collection and aggregation is
proposed in [141] and [142] based on the Lite Cramer-Shoup Scheme [41].
3. Secure sum. One way to implement the secure sum is by means of Paillier cryp-
tosystem, as proposed in [151]. Another secure sum technique is used in [11]
based on the algorithm in [38]. The basic idea of this algorithm is shown in
Fig.s 15.16-15.21. Bob, Alice, and Charlie have their own secrets, as shown
Fig. 15.16 Secrets of Bob, Alice, and Charlie
in Fig. 15.16, and they would each like to compute the sum without revealing
their own secret values. Any arbitrary initiator may start the process. Let Bob ini-
Fig. 15.17 Bob’s secret random values
tiate it in our example by generating a random profile, as shown in Fig.s 15.17.
Bob adds the random secret profile to its secret profile, shown in Fig.s 15.18.
Fig. 15.18 Bob’s secret random values added to his own secret
Bob sends its secret plus random secret to Alice. Note that Alice cannot break
up the totals to find out Bob’s secret. Alice adds her own secrets to the values
received from Bob, as shown in Fig.s 15.19. Fig.s 15.20 show that Charlie gets
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Fig. 15.19 Alice receives Bob’s transmission
Fig. 15.20 Charlie receives Alice’s transmission
Fig. 15.21 Bob receives Charlie’s transmission and computes the sum
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Alice’s transmission and adds his values. Bob receives the profile from Charlie,
subtracts the random secret only known to him and reaches the sum, without
knowing either Alice’s or Charlie’s values and disseminates it to the others, as
shown in Fig.s 15.21.
4. Secret sharing. The basic idea of secret sharing is to break up a message M into
k parts before transmission in such a division that the original message M can
be assembled together from these n pieces while even access to n− 1 parts will
not be sufficient to infer M. The techniques for such a goal have been introduced
by Shamir in [145]. Secret sharing has been exploited in [141] and [142] to de-
velop a secure and distributed protocol with privacy-preserving aggregation of
SG metering data.
4.3.2.5 Pseudonymity
Unlike anonymity, where identity is hidden and/or decoupled from the message, in
pseudonymity, fictitious names are used to represent messages. The real identity to
the fictitious mapping must be kept secret. Examples of this approach are proposed
in [51], [34],[108], [60], and [133]. We provide some details of one these here.
The privacy-preserving authentication scheme for an SG network (PASS) [34]
involves the use of a smart appliance (located at customers homes) attached to a
tamper-resistant device for generating pseudo identities and signatures on messages.
A customer is given this device when he or she opens an account or registers a newly
purchased smart appliance. The characteristic features of the PASS architecture are
as follows:
• Message authentication: before a smart appliance transmits a request message
to the control center, it has to include a hash-based message authentication code
(HMAC) signature on the message using the regional system key. This regional
system key is only known by the control center, the substation, and all tamper-
resistant devices within the region. Hence, an outside attacker (who does not
belong to the region or is not a registered smart appliance) does not know how to
generate a valid HMAC signature. Thus, the PASS scheme protects from outsider
attacks.
• Identity privacy: in all request messages sent by a smart appliance, real identities
are used instead of pseudo identities.
• Request message confidentiality: the amount of electricity required by a smart
appliance is encrypted using the public key of the control center. Thus, except
for the control center, no one can decrypt the value representing the electricity
amount. On the other hand, the encryption feature in the PASS architecture al-
lows a substation to aggregate request messages sent by smart appliances within
its region but the substation does not need to know about those individual amount
values.
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4.3.2.6 Zero-Knowledge Proof
Zero-knowledge proofs are those convincing assertions that yield nothing but their
validity [70]. In other words, one party proves to another without revealing any in-
formation besides a statement of affirmation or decline. The authors of [137] deal
with preserving the privacy of metered data. The authors propose a set of privacy-
preserving protocols amongst a provider, a user agent, and a simple tamper-evident
meter by taking advantage of a zero-knowledge proof. This work considers a sce-
nario illustrated in Fig. 15.22. As shown in the figure, the privacy of the metered data
Fig. 15.22 Interaction among various parties involved in a smart metering scenario [137].
is preserved by employing encryption mechanisms along with certification tech-
niques. Within the boundary shown in the diagram (i.e., home environment) plain-
text is used, but when sending or communicating with entities outside the home
boundary, certification, and encryption techniques are used. The authors argue that
their scheme can be applied to all types of smart metering including electricity,
water,s and gas metering, and can be extended for other future smart meter-based
systems. The main contribution of this work can be summarized as follows: the me-
30 Suleyman Uludag, Sherali Zeadally, and Mohamad Badra
ter produces certified readings of measurements and transmits them to the user via a
secure communication channel. For billing, the user combines those readings with
a certified tariff policy to produce a final bill. The bill is then transmitted to the
provider alongside a zero-knowledge proof that ensures the calculation to be correct
and leaks no additional information. A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge [13]
is a two-party protocol between a prover and a verifier. The prover demonstrates
to the verifier its knowledge of some secret input (witness) that fulfills some state-
ments without disclosing this input to the verifier. The protocol should meet two
properties: (1) it should be a proof of knowledge, which means that a prover with-
out knowledge of the secret input convinces the verifier with negligible probability,
and (2) it should be zero-knowledge, that is, the verifier learns nothing but the truth
of the statement. The fact that a witness is not distinguishable from active partici-
pants is a weaker property which requires that the proof does not reveal the witness
(among all possible witnesses) used by the prover.
4.3.2.7 Blind Signature
In [31], the authors consider an SG network as three basic layers: at the highest
layer, there is a control center maintained by the power operator, the second layer
has substations inside the distribution network and each substation is responsible
for the power supply of an area, and the lowest layer has the smart meters which are
placed at the users’ premises as shown in Fig. 15.23.
PO
DS DS DS DSDS
SM SM SM SM SM SM
Fig. 15.23 A three-layer Smart Grid architecture. PO: power operator, DS: distribution substation,
SM: smart meter
The proposed anonymous credential architecture [31] preserves users’ privacy
information, including their daily electricity usage pattern from third parties as well
as from the power operator. The scheme is based on blind signatures [26]. Blind
signature is a method that allows the first party (Party 1) to sign a message generated
by a second party (Party 2), without knowing its actual content. When a third party
(Party 3) receives the signed message, it can verify that the message is signed by
Party 1. The anonymous credential scheme uses the blind signature technique to
allow the control center (Party 1) to sign a credential generated by a customer (Party
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2) without knowing its actual content. At a later time, the control center itself (Party
3) can verify that the credential is indeed signed by Party 1 without knowing who
requested the signature or when the signature was generated. The use of the blind
signature technique in this scheme is as follows: the customers prepare a set of
credentials, each stating the amount of electricity requested, and request the control
center to sign them blindly so that the customer can submit any of these credentials
for the request of electricity. Since Party 1 does not know the actual content of the
message sent by Party 2, the message is verified using a special technique which
is widely adopted in e-cash schemes. Party 2 generates n messages using different
blinding factors. It then blinds the n messages and sends them to Party 1. Next, Party
1 randomly chooses m messages (m < n) and challenges Party 2 to reveal them
by providing the m blinding factors. If the m blinding factors are correct, Party 1
accepts the signature request and signs the remaining (m−n) messages. The scheme
assumes that any smart meter can communicate with the control center via a secure
communication channel (such as one using the advanced encryption standard (AES)
and third parties cannot read the contents without the key concerned).
When a customer presents a credential anonymously, the control center cannot
tell which customer is making the request, yet it can verify the signature to con-
firm that it is from a valid customer (since only valid customers can request blind
signatures). The four phases involved in the Anonymous Credential scheme are as
follows:
• Setup phase. The control center assigns a Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard
Adleman (RSA) public and private key pair for signing credentials.
• Registration phase. Carried out at the beginning of each month. This phase is
not anonymous. Customers need to be authenticated using their real identities via
an authenticated channel.
• Power requesting phase. Can be executed at any time during the month when
the smart meter of a customer finds that it needs more power to support all the
electric appliances. This phase is anonymous. Customers are validated via anony-
mous credentials.
• Reconciliation phase. Carried out at the end of each month. This phase is not
anonymous. The smart meter sends the unused credentials back to the control
center to evaluate the amount of power requested so far.
Another approach based on the fair blind signature [148] method is reported
in [108] for the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) system, involving both charging and discharg-
ing of battery vehicles (BVs). Fair blind signature is an extension of the basic blind
signature scheme where misuse of the system against black-mailing and money
laundering is prevented by means of an embedded property to remove anonymity
via a trusted entity. In our case, it is used to ensure proper billing.
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4.3.3 Priced oblivious transfer
Oblivious transfer, introduced in 1981 in [134], is a protocol in which the sender
remains unaware of what has been transmitted out of the potentially transferable
many pieces. Using oblivious transfer protocol, a protocol is developed in [6], called
priced oblivious transfer, to enable buyers purchase digital goods from vendors with-
out letting the seller learn what, and to the extent possible, when and how much.
Priced Oblivious protocol is used in [56] to propose a privacy preserving billing
protocol which guarantees the power operator gets the correct amount of money
without learning the current energy consumption of each customer.
4.3.4 Certified tariffs
As explained in Section 4.3.2.6 (the subsection on Zero-knowledge proof) from
[137], the energy provider cannot gather any fine-grained readings. The provider is
guaranteed that the correct fee is calculated based on the actual readings and time-
of-use tariffs without learning.
4.3.5 Sampling interval
Smart meters in the AMI system provide sampling of measurements and potentially
other useful information and report them back to the power operator or other third
parties. The sampling process is the center of privacy concerns as it transmits po-
tentially sensitive information. The authors in [22] consider sampling as a design
parameter in the performance of DR schemes to explore some trade-offs between
performance and privacy. An optimization problem is considered to find the right
sampling interval given a set of performance goals and desired privacy level.
4.3.6 Perturbation
Another technique for privacy preservation that has gained a considerable attention
is a set of techniques collectively known under the term perturbation. A taxonomy
with the cited work is depicted in Fig. 15.24. A common theme in these techniques
is the transformation of the energy consumption data from what gets disclosed out
of the customer premises. We provide details of this category with its subclasses in
what follows.
4.3.6.1 Privacy using Orthogonal Code
The work in [162] analyzes security and privacy in the SG and specifically empha-
sizes the privacy aspects. The authors propose a secure and efficient in-network data
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Fig. 15.24 Perturbation-based temporal privacy-provisioning techniques for the Smart Grid
aggregation and dispatch scheme for AMI in home area networks for the SG. In-
network aggregation is the process of collecting content from multiple sources or
devices in a network. With this mechanism, the authors propose the use of Walsh
function [36] based on Hadamard code [155] to generate mutual orthogonal chip
codes to be used in the secure in-network data aggregation and dispatch scheme.
The use of orthogonal code allows multiple users to communicate simultaneously
over a single frequency. This is achieved by the use of spreading codes whereby a
single data bit is “spread” over a longer sequence of transmitted bits. These codes,
also known as chip sequences, must be carefully chosen so that the data may be
correctly “de-spread” at the receiver. Such codes are known as orthogonal codes.
The Hadamard code [155] is an error-correcting code that is usually used for error
detection and correction when transmitting messages over very noisy or unreliable
channels. In their work, the authors apply these techniques envisioning that the smart
meter works as an authentication server that is connected with multiple smart de-
vices and each smart device contributes to the formation of confidential data, which
can be regenerated at the smart meter. This work describes the coding techniques
and the steps on how the original data readings are spread and then mixed up with
the spreading code of other smart devices. The smart meter can reconstruct the orig-
inal reading data from the mixed data using the chip code established with smart
devices during their initialization procedure through mutual authentications.
Another work that encrypts measured data by orthogonal codes by using Walsh
code is reported in [103], which uses a ring communication architecture.
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4.3.6.2 Time series-based Privacy
One way to look at the measurements coming out of the smart meters is a series of
data giving way to a wealth of methods that can be invoked from the field of time
series. We present a survey of some of these methods here.
1. Load signature moderation: Load signature moderation (LSM) [90] scheme
suggests that the home electrical power routing can be used to moderate the
home’s load signature in order to hide appliance usage information. Load sig-
nature is defined as a series of time-stamped average power loads p(t) derived
from cumulative energy values e(t) metered at interval ∆ t:
p(t) =
e(t)− e(t−∆ t)
∆ t
(15.2)
A home load signature is the sum of all home appliance loads. To perform load
signature moderation, the authors assume that future smart homes will contain
a variety of energy storage and energy generation devices, and thus electrical
power routing will be feasible. Electrical power routing means the selective con-
trol and power mixing of a number of electricity sources to route electricity
to a number of consumers. For instance, a kettle drawing 2kW of power when
switched on; the power router could be configured so that 1kW is supplied from
a solar panel, 0.5kW from a battery, and 0.5kW from the main electricity sup-
ply. The basic contribution of this approach is that it presents the idea how to
provide sufficient privacy for the user by including privacy mechanisms for the
smart meters which is supposed to record the usage. The authors also propose
a power management model using a rechargeable battery, a power mixing al-
gorithm, and evaluate its protection level by proposing three different privacy
metrics: an information theoretic (relative entropy), a clustering classification,
and a correlation/regression one. We will briefly review these metrics:
• Relative entropy: the relative entropy or Kullback Leibler distance [14] is a
well-known information theoretic quantity which can be used to compare two
sources of information. The distance here is not the mathematical meaning
of distance but rather it quantifies the relation between probability densities.
If p0 and p1 are two probability densities, the Kullback-Leibler distance is
defined to be,
D(p0||p1) =
∫ xmax
xmin
p1(x)log
p1(x)
p0(x)
dx (15.3)
where p0 and p1 are the probability density functions of p0 and p1, respec-
tively.
Relative entropy is always positive, and for identical p0 and p1, it is zero.
Hence, the authors in [90] state that the level of privacy protection offered by
a mapping /0 can be measured by the relative entropy, D /0(p0||p1) such that the
higher the level of protection offered by /0, the larger the relative entropy.
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• Clustering classification: the authors propose using any of the available clus-
tering classification mechanisms which takes a set of data with a distance met-
ric and groups them into n clusters that minimize the distance between points.
The distance metric here is the difference between power consumption values.
They propose to use a simple method of trace analysis that aims to recover in-
formation about device power usage from a small amount of information sent
via the signals.
• Regression analysis: as a third metric, the work described in [26] quantifies
privacy by combining cross correlation and regression procedures, which can
be termed as regression analysis. In statistics, regression analysis includes
many techniques for modeling and analyzing several variables, when the focus
is on the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more indepen-
dent variables. A dependent variable is what is measured in an experiment and
what is affected during the experiment. This kind of variable responds to the
independent variable. It is termed so because it depends on the independent
variable. In a scientific experiment, there cannot be a dependent variable with-
out an independent variable. Just as an example, if someone is interested to
find out how time spent on studying changes “test score”, then it is understood
that the test score does not change the time spent, as that had happened earlier.
In this case, “studying time” is the independent variable and “test score” is the
dependent variable. Based on these foundations and ideas, the authors in this
work apply regression analysis on the received signals to recover information
by comparing them over time.
This work can be extended to include other types of privacy metrics, such as
mutual entropy or equivocation. In addition, smarter battery privacy algorithms
may be designed, which the authors have left as future works.
2. Theory of rate distortion: Rate-distortion theory is a subfield of information
theory that addresses the problems of lossy compression. It analyzes the theoret-
ical fundamentals of determining the bit rate to be communicated over a commu-
nications channel in order for the original data to be reconstructed at the receiver
subject to a distortion level.
Information theoretic approaches to SG privacy have been proposed in a few
studies [74, 135, 144] by means of the rate-distortion theory. Rate-distortion the-
ory has been used to provide SG privacy in a few recent studies [74, 135, 144].
[135] and [144] attempt to quantify privacy in order to gain insight into the trade-
off between sharing information (utility) and hiding it (privacy). The utility is
represented by means of square error (distortion D)
D =
1
n
n
∑
k=1
E[(Xk− Xˆk)2] (15.4)
where Xk is the actual measurement, Xˆk is the exposed value; while privacy is
represented by information leakage:
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L =
1
n
I (Yn; Xˆn) (15.5)
where Yn represents the inferred data as a random variable correlated with the
measurement variable X . Some examples of interference sequence Yn include
the known appliance signatures that are provided by NILM techniques discussed
earlier in Section 3.3. The proposed algorithm, interference-aware reverse water-
filling solution, exposes high power but less private appliance information and
filters out components with lower power to a distortion threshold. However, this
proposal is only limited to a framework proposal and an algorithmic approach is
not detailed enough to implement it.
Another rate-distortion theory based approach is given in [74]. However, similar
to the previous ones, it also suffers from unrealistic assumptions and the the
approach is complex. For instance, the assumption about binary input and output
loads are unrealistic.
3. Zero-Sum Errors. The authors of [94] propose a cooperative state vector esti-
mation technique that preserves the privacy of the personal behavior of the user.
Unlike most other privacy preservation techniques for the SG where energy con-
sumption information is the focus, the authors here provide privacy protection
for phase angle measurements. Thus, they take advantage of the state estimation
methodology [81]. The key objectives are to ensure mainly two things: (1) the
power measurement is well obfuscated such that users do not fully disclose their
private behavioral information, and (2) the obfuscated data retains the necessary
or basic information such that the state vector (a column vector whose com-
ponents are the state variables of the system) can be accurately estimated from
the perturbed data. “Perturbed data” are the original measurement data that are
modified to conceal the information and to make it difficult to infer the original
data. Another significant contribution of this work is that the authors evaluated
the performance of the proposed data obfuscation scheme with 1,349 measure-
ment data sets. For this, they used the data sets as if they are connected to five
different IEEE test systems that are portions of the Middlewestern US Electric
Power Grids. They also evaluated the illegibility to human inspectors, resilience
to automated data mining attackers, and communication overhead.
4.3.6.3 Privacy with Probability Distribution Functions
Another method of transforming the exposed measurement data is by means of
adding noise from probability distribution functions.
1. Binomail. Binomial distribution is proposed in [86, 170].
2. Gaussian.
a. Basic: straight Gaussian distribution is used to determine the magnitude of the
noise in [169], [16], [106], and [136].
b. Offset: [136] proposed a noise canceling mechanism by using a technique
which is based on the Central Limit Theorem. In the offset method, the margin
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caused by noises in previous time slots is compensated to achieve zero error
in billing computation.
3. Laplacian. Laplace distribution is the basis for computing the noise in [5]. [29]
employs symmetric geometric distribution, which can be regarded as a discrete
approximation of Laplace distribution. The use of geometric distribution for the
noise was pioneered by [68].
4.3.6.4 Differential privacy
The notion of differential privacy is coined in [49] and [50]. Differential privacy
has emerged from the field of database queries where the goal is to answer queries
in an accurate way while preserving the privacy of individuals. Differential pri-
vacy yields plausible deniability to blur the data hidden behind. It is about an
information-releasing algorithm with a mathematical underlying model. Differen-
tial privacy boils down to distorting the answers to the database queries by means
of adding a predefined noise so that the intended receiver filters it out to reach an
almost accurate answer. As can be seen from the problem definition, this is appli-
cable to the SG privacy case as well. Differential privacy-based mechanisms have
been proposed in [5], [29], [86], and [170].
4.3.7 Aggregation
To secure the data-collection task, there are two major approaches: one is to ensure
the protection of the data content directly without regard to the data semantics. The
approach presented in [132] is based on symmetric cryptography to provide data
confidentiality and authentication between sensors and the base station. [43] de-
scribes a protocol for data collector (DC) to collect data from a measurement device
(MD), but direct communication between the DC and the MD is assumed. Another
category for providing security exploits the aggregate statistics of the sensed data,
such as summation, average, minimum, maximum, and so on. These approaches
take advantage of in-network data processing (also referred to as aggregation) to
apply some obfuscating operations on the transmitted data [35], [58], [73], [78],
[79], [98], [101], [124], [142], and [162]. A few common examples in this cate-
gory include cluster-based private data aggregation [78] and its integrity enhanced
version [79], secret perturbation [58], k-indistinguishable privacy-preserving data
aggregation [73], a centralized authentication server based in-network aggregation
for AMI [98, 162], homomorphic encryption-based aggregation [28, 33, 101], a se-
cure architecture for distributed secure hierarchical data collection aggregation of
additive data [141, 142], a secure and scalable data collection protocol for smart
meter data [87, 152], multifunctional, privacy-protecting aggregation [29], and a
network coding-based encryption between smart meters and aggregators [124]. An-
other one is reported in [110]. Many of the existing data aggregation schemes collect
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information as one-dimensional information. However, smart meter data could be
considered as multi-dimensional in nature, because, these include including various
aspects of the information such as the amount of energy consumed, the time it was
consumed, the purpose of the consumption, and so on. Considering the high data
collection frequency, multi-dimensional information and the large number of users,
current data aggregation schemes generate not only huge communication costs but
also impose overwhelming processing load on local gateways. In contrast to tradi-
tional one-dimensional data aggregation methods, Energy Privacy Preserving Ag-
gregation (EPPA), as discussed earlier in Section 4.3.2.4, is shown to greatly reduce
computational cost and significantly improve communication efficiency while satis-
fying the real-time high-frequency data collection requirements in SG communica-
tions. The main drawback of the work is that it is highly theoretical and it does not
really provide enough details on how such an approach can be deployed in practice.
5 Challenges and Opportunities
The preservation of privacy in the SG environment has many fundamental open
challenges that still need to be solved. As our literature survey shows, several re-
search projects have been investigating privacy-preserving techniques for the SG
environment in the last few years. We found that there is need for privacy to be
comprehensively regulated through legal and regulatory frameworks for enhancing
users’ confidence and for reinforcing individual’s privacy rights. These frameworks
should provide a comprehensive view of both the challenges and limitations related
to personal data protection rights as they pertain to the SG technology.
In recent years, a lot of work has been undertaken on designing privacy-preserving
methods using various technical approaches, which vary according to the context
and the architecture in use. Throughout this chapter, various SG privacy solutions
aimed at preserving smart meters’ privacy have been discussed. As we have pointed
out earlier, most of the recently proposed SG solutions have limitations and they
do not always follow the recommendations being made by standardizations entities
and governmental agencies [123]. Although it is not mandatory to follow the rec-
ommended guidelines made by standardization bodies, for future interoperability
and scalability, SG privacy solutions should nevertheless take these recommenda-
tions into consideration. We discuss here some of the challenges that still need to
be addressed in the future by researchers and designers working in the area of SG
privacy.
• Third party issue
The privacy issues in the SG are particularly magnified by the large-scale infras-
tructures, the diversity of communication technologies, the number data sources,
and the high volume of data generated. In the past, most of the SG services were
basically limited to governments or large enterprises, which have traditionally
built by proprietary and isolated infrastructures (e.g., electrical power network)
to provide services to customers. However, third parties can actually offer their
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infrastructures and services with limited control from governments and, hence,
concerns have arisen about third-party access to the customer’s personal infor-
mation.
• Privacy and authentication
Privacy is often closely linked with authentication. The issue of trade-off be-
tween privacy rights of entities and the need to authenticate them needs to be
explored further. Unfortunately, authentication leads to personal information be-
coming available. However, authentication is a very important security service
that may help to eliminate some of the cyber attack classes such as man-in-the-
middle attacks and false data injection attacks. The latter consists of forging and
manipulating the quantities of energy supply and requests. It is worth noting that
authenticated nodes may also inject false data without being detected as is the
case with recently proposed homomorphic encryption-based solutions [9, 10].
• Privacy and forensics
Privacy solutions are also closely linked with verifiability requirements [39] and
with tractability as well as forensic techniques. We should formulate threat mod-
els to detect cyber attacks and data leakage scenarios [39] such as infrastructure
attacks and rogue nodes. In particular, a privacy-preserving solution should pro-
vide a well-maintained log that may help in preventing fraud and in resolving
disputes. Traceability and forensic techniques should be taken into consideration
during service design and the development of service architectures [25]. In the
context of the SG and real-time ecosystems, we should not only cover the effec-
tiveness of privacy-preserving methods, but also have the ability to monitor and
detect anomalies in real-time and analyze the data collected and aggregated from
the different sources. The challenge here is to define an effective method to iden-
tify legitimate traffic, to enable forensic investigation on subversive and illegal
activities, and to mitigate any possible insider attacks against the infrastructure.
In fact, security and forensics techniques are fundamental, especially when an
adversary tampers with a device from which data are collected or aggregated or
when the same adversary successfully performs cloning attacks.
Multi-disciplinary research approaches which consider training, legal, and tech-
nological aspects should be developed to address the privacy issues that arise with
the SG environment. Future SG privacy solutions should include the design and de-
velopment of architectures that prevent unnecessary linking between the user iden-
tity and the SG services, while guaranteeing traceability and accountability in the
presence of an important set of interconnected engineering resources and nodes. We
argue that a holistic approach is needed to identify and address privacy challenges
throughout the engineering phase of the SG in order to ensure SG solutions that
maintain privacy and are also secure, scalable, and cost-effective.
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6 Conclusion
Over the past several years we have witnessed huge investments and interests from
industry and governments in SG technologies. Various stakeholders (residential/
commercial customers, local government, utility operators, etc.) are expected to reap
several benefits associated with the SG including improved energy efficiency, in-
creased reliability, reduced energy costs, greater flexibility in energy consumption,
better safety and security, and an improved environment (through renewable, renew-
able non-variable, non-renewable/non-variable energy sources). The deployment of
SG technologies has also raised considerable concerns in data privacy issues of SG
users, as we have discussed in this chapter. The privacy concerns are mostly related
to the collection and use of energy consumption data. In this context, we have dis-
cussed various SG privacy issues and we have presented SG privacy architectures
and approaches that have been recently proposed in the literature. A unique tax-
onomy of the various privacy protection mechanisms proposed in the literature has
been developed. We also identified the various strengths and weaknesses of these
privacy solutions. The success of SG technology and its wide acceptance rely on
gaining the trust and confidence of customers, which in turn depends on assurances
regarding the protection of their privacy.
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